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Abstract 
 
All major climate policy agreements - the UN Framework Convention, the Kyoto Protocol 
and recently the Copenhagen Accord - have stated that climate finance for developing 
countries will be ”new and additional”. However, the term “new and additional” has never 
been properly defined. Agreeing a system to measure a baseline from which “new and 
additional” funding will be calculated will be central to building trust and realising any post-
Kyoto agreement. We explore eight different options for a baseline, and assess each 
according to several criteria: novelty to existing pledges, additionality to development 
assistance, environmental effectiveness, distributional consequences, and institutional and 
political feasibility. Only two baseline options do well on these criteria and are therefore 
viable: "new funds only" and "above pre-defined business as usual level of development 
assistance". The final section assesses the impact of the baseline definition on the novelty 
and additionality of “fast start finance” pledged under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, 
showing that values can vary from 0 to 100% depending on the definition.  
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1. Introduction   
 
Since the original Stockholm Earth Summit in 1972, developing nations have feared that attention to 
protect the natural environment would sideline their ardent quest for meeting basic development needs 
like health, education and economic growth (Hicks et al. 2008). Therefore, from the very beginning of 
international environmental statecraft, gaining these nations’ cooperation in efforts to address global 
environmental issues required promises for funding above current development assistance (“foreign 
aid”). Early phrasings described “The Earth Increment”, making clear that this funding would not 
come from other promises, such as the 1970 Monterrey pledge of most wealthy countries to send 0.7 
percent of their GNI to assist poor countries overcome their poverty. The phrase “new and additional” 
financial resources was used at the Rio 1992 drafting of the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC 1992), and the language has appeared in every major climate agreement since, 
including the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the 2009 Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009).   
 
The Copenhagen Accord promises of $30 billion in “new and additional“ fast start finance” over 
2010-2012, “scaling up” to $100 billion a year of public and private climate finance by 2020. These 
promises appear very ambitious, and were fundamental to the reaching of any agreement in the 
contentious atmosphere in the Danish capital. Both wealthy and poor nations agree on the need for 
such funds: developing countries need funding to grow their economies without becoming locked in to 
fossil fuel dependence and its high-carbon footprint. Most vulnerable developing countries also need 
substantial funds to prepare for, cope with, and recover from the growing number and intensity of 
climate-related disaster.   
 
However, as happened many times before, the terms “new and additional” were never clearly defined 
at Copenhagen. “New and additional” to what exactly? Additional to what year as a baseline? Which 
funds get considered in such a baseline and in new funds – only those addressing climate change?  
Given the failure of most industrialized nations to meet their previous pledges of foreign aid, from the 
1970 0.7% of GNI pledge to the Gleneagles 2005 promises, developing countries rightly question 
what the term “new and additional climate finance” means in practice. As a result, the phrase’s 
usefulness for removing distrust is plummeting. To restore trust, an agreement on the interpretation of 
“new and additional” is urgently needed. Here, two major challenges arise. First, countries have totally 
different understandings of the term “new and additional” (Brown et al. 2010; Stadelmann et al. 2010; 
WRI 2010). Second, the assessment of “additionality” is methodologically challenging, as both 
realized by the Commission of Sustainable Development (Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 277) and 
scholars (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006). 
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One can argue that the phrase “new and additional” has been less relevant for global environmental 
treaties1 in the past, as official financial payments for developing countries have not reached more than 
$0.15 billion annually per treaty and thus the potential for diversion of large amounts of development 
assistance did just not exist.2 This has significantly changed with Copenhagen where industrialized 
countries pledged $10 billion and more per year. This raises serious questions about both compliance 
with these substantial pledges and their additionality to development assistance.  
 
In this article we address both challenges, the varying baseline definitions of different parties and the 
methodological challenges: First, a series of options for baselines are analysed and second, the eight 
options are assessed on six criteria (novelty to existing pledges, additionality to development 
assistance, effectiveness, distributional consequences, and institutional feasibility). We also examine 
the practical implications of these baseline proposals, and estimate political resistance and support for 
each. We show how fast start finance pledges have very different meanings, depending on the baseline 
options we propose. Billions of dollars are at stake, as are trust in the international policy system and 
the ability of developing countries to address the climate challenge. 
 
 
 
2. Criteria for a baseline  
 
A baseline can be defined as the level against which a commitment or action is measured. In the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol, for example, Annex 1 countries pledged to reduce their emissions by certain 
percentages below a 1990 baseline. That very clear (but not without its own problems) fixed baseline 
might be contrasted to a hypothetical counterfactual that describes a business-as-usual (BAU) 
situation, where the effect of a policy measure is assessed against what would have happened without 
it. These kinds of pledges of reductions in emissions below BAU projections were offered by major 
developing nations such as India and China in the Copenhagen Accord. In the context of new and 
additional climate finance, the baseline seems to logically mean the finance volume that would have 
flowed to developing countries in the absence of climate finance flows. The question is now how to 
define this business-as-usual level3.  
 
The two obvious criteria for setting climate finance baselines are additionality and novelty, as these 
are the criteria they have to fulfil according to various international agreements. Furthermore, 
                                                     
1 Such as for biodiversity, climate change and ozone depletion 
2 It has to be noted that these pledges were much smaller than the $ 125 billion of annual international grants or 
concessional flows needed to implement the Agenda 21 activities as estimated in 1992 (UNDESA 1992), which 
never materialized. However, compliance with the low pledges for biodiversity, climate change and ozone has 
been high (see Benedick 1998; GEF 2006, 2010; Pallemaerts and Armstrong 2009; UNEP 2010).  
3 Substantial experience of how to define baselines has been collected in the context of climate change mitigation 
in developing countries financed through the CDM, see Michaelowa et al. (2007). 
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baselines can be assessed according to the four criteria for climate policies set out by the 4th 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (Gupta et al. 2007): environmental effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, 
distributional considerations and institutional feasibility. We divide institutional feasibility into three 
sub-criteria: a proposed method’s political acceptability, its feasibility under budget constraints, its 
transparency, and whether it interferes with other international regimes. The importance and definition 
of each of these criteria is explained in the following; 
 
Additionality to development assistance 
The discussion about development assistance baselines began essentially with the pledge of “new and 
additional” resources in Rio 1992. The Commission on Sustainable Development unsuccessfully tried 
to establish an indicator for “new and additional” financial resources (Yamin and Depledge 2004, p. 
277). The question was further taken up in the discussion on “diversion” of development assistance in 
the context of CDM projects from 2000 onwards (Asuka 2000; Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006). 
Apparently, the lessons from this debate did not inform the discussion about climate finance that has 
taken off since 2007. Here “additionality” is an often used term but its meaning has never been clearly 
defined. Some understand “additional” as “additional to existing aid flows”, while most developing 
countries and NGOs understand it as additional to existing developed country promises to provide 
0.7% of their GNI as “official development assistance” (ODA) (Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006; 
Müller et al. 2010; Oxfam 2009). We use a middle-ground definition: climate finance is additional if it 
leads to an increase both compared to present and projected future development assistance. Climate 
finance may be counted as ODA but the development part of ODA4 is not allowed to be reduced 
below “business-as-usual” projections. This is a technically clear definition but international 
institutions as well as recipients may find it difficult to assess the “business-as-usual” (BAU) levels of 
development assistance (DA). Donors may have some incentives to not reveal the real BAU level of 
development assistance, similar to the distortion of investment parameters by project owners in the 
context of CDM projects. We will later assess which definitions for baselines can minimise gaming. 
 
Novelty to existing flows and pledges 
According to Müller et al. (2010) “new” mainly refers “to funds which are separate from those that 
have already been promised, for climate change or as overseas development assistance”. However, 
novelty” is also increasingly understood as new funding sources such as a tax on financial market 
transactions, auctioning of emission allowances or levies on air and maritime transport (Müller et al. 
2010). The idea behind defining novelty as “new sources” is that industrialized countries’ government 
budgets, especially the part dedicated for developing countries, are always subject to domestic 
                                                     
4 Official Development Assistance (ODA) as defined by the OECD-DAC currently consists of real development 
assistances but also of other funds such as for global environmental goods (e.g. Multilateral Fund in the ozone 
regime or several climate funds). 
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pressures (Bulír and Hamann 2008; Doornbosch and Knight 2008; Fischer and Easterley 1990). 
Therefore, governmental funds for climate finance can always be funds that had already been pledged 
in the past, or promised as development assistance; and funds are only then really “new” if they stem 
from new sources other than government pledges. While the“new sources” definition has clearly its 
merits, it does not clearly distinguish between old and new commitments. Therefore, we define “new 
funds”, following Müller et al. (2010) as funds that have not yet been promised for supporting 
developing countries’ climate or development actions. 
 
Environmental and cost-effectiveness  
The IPCC (Gupta et al. 2007) lists environmental effectiveness as the first criterion to evaluate 
environmental policies. Environmental effectiveness is understood here as the level of climate change 
mitigation and adaptation achieved5. Assuming that an increase in funds leads to an increase in 
mitigation and/or adaptation6, a baseline is environmentally effective if it increases funds useable for 
climate mitigation and adaptation compared to business as usual. We can assume that the more 
stringent a baseline is regarding novelty to existing climate funds, the more climate funds will be paid. 
On the other hand, stringency for additionality to existing development funds may limit climate funds 
and environmental effectiveness, as the baseline definition does not allow for diversion of 
development assistance.  
 
The (IPCC) criterion “cost-effectiveness” cannot be judged, because the baseline does not influence 
how the funds are spent. Moreover, a baseline leveraging more funds can have different impacts: scale 
and learning effects linked to the size of the programmes may increase cost-effectiveness, while the 
exhaustion of cheap options can decrease it. If one assumes monotonously rising mitigation and 
adaptation cost curves, the latter effect is likely to dominate. 
 
Distributional considerations 
As with any economic policy measure, climate policy measures will have distributional impacts.  For 
this reason, commonly used terms in the climate policy context are “equity” and "fairness”, while 
responsibility, capability and needs are the accepted principles for equity (Ringius et al. 2002). 
Distributional considerations have focused on the phrase “fair burden sharing” (see e.g. Müller et al. 
2009). In our study we consider distributional questions by assessing the impact of different baselines 
on burden sharing between developed and developing countries. We assume that current climate 
                                                     
5 Strictly speaking, only mitigation has an “environmental” impact by reducing climate change, while adaptation 
has mainly direct economic benefits. However, we can easily assume that at least part of climate finance is used 
for mitigation.  
6 This assumption is dependent on the allocation of funds. We may imagine situations where climate funding 
actually leads to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions, e.g. if funds are allocated to energy efficient coal 
power plants, which would have been built anyway. 
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policy pledges (mitigation and finance) of developed countries are way below their fair share of the 
burden, when considering various burden sharing studies7 (Baer et al. 2007; Bernard et al. 2006; 
Chakravarty et al. 2009; Den Elzen et al. 2005; Den Elzen and Höhne 2008; Marklund and Samakovlis 
2007; Pan 2003).  A baseline, therefore, adequately addresses distribution the more it shifts the burden 
away from developing nations, least responsible for the problem and least capable to adapt. 
 
Institutional feasibility  
The last IPCC criterion for environmental policy is institutional feasibility, or broadly speaking the 
question of whether the theoretical ideas can be implemented, given the existing institutions and 
political considerations in industrialized and developing countries. To be institutionally feasible, a 
baseline has to be politically acceptable by both Northern and Southern governments, it has to be 
feasible given budget constraints in the North, its assessment has to be transparent, and finally, the 
baseline has to be consistent with other international regimes. 
 
Political acceptability (North-South) 
Not even the most objective definition of a baseline will be feasible if it is not accepted by the major 
Parties to the UN framework convention. Political acceptability is an important precondition for 
participation, a key criterion for success of an environmental regime (see e.g. Wettestad 1999). 
Participation is a widespread concern for the climate regime after the US did not ratify Kyoto (Barrett 
and Stavins 2003); thus the impact of future non-participation has been studied as well (e.g. Keppo 
and Rao 2007; van Vuuren et al. 2009). As the world’s emissions are currently evenly split between 
developed and developing countries (PBL 2009), while the share of developing countries’ emissions 
will further rise in the future (van Vuuren et al. 2009), the acceptability for both Northern as well as 
Southern countries has to be assured. Under a universal international climate treaty, horse trading of 
climate finance and mitigation targets would be possible, which would allow one to bring baseline 
stringency in as one parameter of negotiations. However, the lack of progress in international climate 
negotiations makes the fragmentation of the regime more and more likely and thus reduces horse 
trading options. Furthermore, the room for concessions is narrow at the moment, as the North is 
dealing with the consequences of a major economic crisis and the South is harbouring mistrust due to 
past disappointments on finance pledges. Therefore, political acceptability of baseline stringency as 
part of the climate finance negotiations is a major criterion; a baseline will be politically feasible if it is 
expected to be acceptable to the major Parties to the UN framework convention.8 
 
                                                     
7 Also advanced developing countries such as China, South Korea or Mexico may have to contribute more. 
However, the bulk of climate finance will likely flow to poorer countries. 
8  As Copenhagen showed, even one nation can block consensus in the UNFCCC process. Therefore it remains 
to be seen what combination of countries would have to accept a baseline formula for it to make it into approved 
UNFCCC text.   
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Feasibility under a budget constraint 
Even if the industrialized countries accept a certain baseline definition, it is not clear if it can really 
leverage additional climate funds without diverting development assistance, given the budget 
constraints currently faced by developed countries. For a government with a budget constraint, the 
situation is depicted in Figure 1. The current and future development assistance level does not exhaust 
the budget, but is seen as politically optimal. We assume that the government willingness to spend on 
“additional” climate finance is the residual of the budget constraint. In the case of a  baseline less 
stringent than BAU development assistance, the government will increase climate finance at the 
expense of development assistance as far as the baseline permits9, due to the preferences of the 
electorate to embark on climate policy  In the case of a baseline that is more stringent than BAU of 
development assistance, the country increases development assistance spending beyond the current 
level until the entire budget is spent, in order to be able to generate “new and additional climate 
funds.” If the baseline stringency goes beyond the budget constraint, then the country cannot spend 
anything on “additional” climate finance and development assistance spending abruptly decreases to 
the BAU level Therefore, the only feasible baselines under budget constraint are the ones between the 
projected BAU level of development assistance and the budget constraint10. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
9 While diversion of projected development assistance is probable, we may hardly see a decrease in the current 
level of DA funding.  
10 One can also interpret this criterion as both covering the criteria of “political acceptability in the North” and 
additionality to development assistance. 
Feasible 
baselines
Level of 
funds 
 
Budget 
Constraint 
 
 
 
Projected DA 
 
Current DA  
 
Development 
assistance (DA)
Baseline 
stringency
Climate 
finance
Figure 1: Impact of baseline stringency on the level of spending for development assistance (bold line) and 
climate finance (dashed bold line) in case of budget constraint 
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Transparency: clarity of definition and availability of data. 
The importance of transparency for environmental regimes is acknowledged by academic scholars, 
governments and NGOs (Mitchell 1998). Transparency helps for achieving and assessing compliance 
and effectiveness, which has been studied both for security and environmental regimes (Mitchell 1998; 
Roberts and Parks 2007). In the climate regime, financial contributions have haphazardly been 
included in national communications, but transparency only came to the forefront when the notion of  
“national appropriate mitigation actions [...] supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” was included in the Bali Action 
Plan (UNFCCC 2008). By this wording, not only the actions of developing but also the financial 
support of developed countries was to be measured and verified. While the Parties are still negotiating 
the way this has to be done, scholars have already identified the need for more transparency: the new 
climate funds set up in the last few years lack transparency (Stewart et al. 2009) and more transparent 
guidelines for finance reporting are needed under the UNFCCC (Roberts et al. 2010a; Tirpak et al. 
2010). This seems especially important when considering the incoherent labelling of climate-related 
ODA in the past (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2010).   
 
The transparency of a baseline is given if international organizations or parties can easily assess 
whether the baseline for climate finance has been complied with. This assessment is possible if two 
conditions are met: first, the definition of a baseline must be crystal clear to avoid renegotiation and 
redefinition. Second, the data for measurement and verification must be accessible and assessable. 
Therefore, we will assess the transparency of baseline definitions by both analysing the clarity of the 
definition and the availability of data. 
 
Consistency with other regimes 
Rules within the climate change regime may interfere with rules of other regimes. This has especially 
been studied for the case of border carbon adjustment and the trade regime (see e.g. Biermann and 
Brohm 2005; Brewer 2004; Charnovitz 2003). In the case of climate finance, we may have some 
interference with the rules for accounting development assistance. The Organization of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has established standards for what counts as ODA, and it has also 
set up accounting categories for both mitigation and adaptation under its Rio Markers system (OECD 
2009). The re-definition of what counts as ODA would be a major challenge given the established 
OECD rules, while the re-definition of climate finance is more probable, as the existing Rio Markers 
system is not very well elaborated, leading to misreporting. Beside the definition of ODA or climate 
finance, a baseline definition may also include assumptions on the pledged level of ODA, which is an 
even larger intervention into the development assistance regime. Therefore, we define the consistency 
with other regimes as the level of non-interference with the development assistance regime. 
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Incentives for enforcement 
Institutional feasibility is a necessary condition for adoption of a climate finance baseline, but it does 
not ensure that the countries actually adhere to the baseline definition. To avoid gaming and outright 
non-conformity with baseline rules (e.g. by converting current development assistance into climate 
finance and counting both in their full amounts), incentives for developed countries are needed. Gupta 
et al. (2007) distinguish between soft incentives (e.g. side payments) and hard incentives (e.g. trade 
measures) for climate policy compliance. However, neither of them is currently particularly feasible: 
while soft measures11 like payments for payments are a non-sum game, trade measures are not feasible 
given the relative unimportance of climate finance in international relations. Therefore, we set 
enforcement incentives to one side for this analysis, assuming transparency and measurability will be 
the most critical elements of whether contributors could be held to account for not meeting their 
agreed share of “new and additional” climate finance.   
 
 
 
3. Eight options for a baseline   
 
In this section we describe the baseline options and assess how well they perform on the criteria just 
listed.12 For all options denominated in absolute currency units, real values should be chosen to avoid 
that a baseline devalues over time. 
 
Option 1: 0.7% of GNI 
Developing countries overwhelmingly prefer that the ticker for new and additional funding start only 
after countries have contributed 0.7% of their gross national income (GNI) to ODA. The target that 
developed countries provide 0.7% of their Gross National Income (GNI) as ODA has first been 
mentioned in the Report of the Commission on International Development (Pearson 1969), without 
any clear explanation on how this has been calculated (Clemens and Moss 2005). The 0.7% target has 
been several time restated, e.g. at the ”Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and importantly in the 
final declaration of the UN’s International Conference on Financing for Development in 
Monterrey 2002, where many heads of state attended (Clemens and Moss 2005)13. Until now, the 
0.7% has been reached by only a very small number of countries, and the highest overall ratio of ODA 
                                                     
11 Among soft measures, moral pressure by NGOs and media may have some impact but it does not guarantee 
compliance. 
12 This selection of baseline options is expanded from Stadelmann et al. (2010) and adapted to newest policy 
trends as well as ideas of Brown et al. (2010). 
13 In contrast to the public perception, industrialized countries actually for a long time never promised to reach 
the 0.7% target but only to make efforts to attain it (Clemens and Moss 2005). This changed when the EU 
pledged that their old member states reach the 0.7% level by 2015 (EU 2005). 
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to GNI has been achieved before the target was even set (see Figure 2 and Annex 2 for industrialized 
countries individual ODA/GNI ratio).  
 
The 0.7% GNI threshold is also a favourite of European countries like Sweden and the Netherlands 
that already meet this ODA standard. Although this threshold seems transparent and takes into account 
past pledges by developed countries, it is not viable for two reasons. First, many developed countries 
will in the next few years neither accept nor reach this threshold—especially the United States, with 
less than 0.2% of its GNI going to ODA. Second, countries like Sweden and Denmark, which today 
exceed the 0.7% mark, may just divert existing ODA commitments and call them new and additional 
climate finance. The non-feasibility of the 0.7% threshold has already been explained by Dutschke & 
Michaelowa (2006) for the case of the CDM. 
 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of ODA to GNI over time 
 
Sources: OECD 2010 (ODA), World Bank (GNI of OECD countries) 
 
 
Option 2: No agreed baseline 
On the other end of the spectrum, most industrialized countries favour having no agreed baseline, so 
that each contributor defines its own baseline. This option is clearly not acceptable for developing 
countries, as 'new and additional' loses any meaning. Comparing funding across nations becomes very 
difficult, transparency is hardly given, and diversion of development assistance is likely. This option is 
the current state of affairs at this writing. 
 
Option 3: New UN channels only 
A simple option for avoiding this situation with unclear baselines is to count only funding disbursed 
through new UN channels, such as the Adaptation Fund or the planned Copenhagen Green Climate 
Fund. Although technically clear, the “new channels only” approach reduces flexibility for 
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contributors and potentially leaves them less willing to use the term “new and additional”. Some 
existing channels may be better suited for certain types of flows or certain efforts to address climate 
change. A variant that may be more acceptable to industrialized countries is to consider all new kinds 
of funds. Regardless, this approach could have absurd consequences if old commitments are simply 
redirected into new funds.  
 
Option 4: No ODA counts 
Another straightforward option would allow using the best channels and mechanisms, but would not 
count ODA money as climate finance, to clearly separate between development and climate funds.14 
Double-counting could be avoided and transparency enhanced. This approach forces contributors to 
decide whether the main goal of funding is development or climate related. Despite the advantages of 
this approach, it is rejected by most industrialized countries, as they prefer to use climate funds to 
reach their ODA targets, and argue that climate change issues should be “mainstreamed” into existing 
development assistance (but see note 15). Furthermore, this baseline approach could quite heavily 
interfere with the development assistance regime, as it sets conditions of what can be counted as ODA. 
A softened version of this option is the idea of former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown to limit 
the climate finance that can be accounted as ODA to 10% of overall ODA contribution. All climate 
finance beyond this 10% need to come from other sources to be seen as “new and additional” (Brown 
et al. 2010). 
 
Option 5: Current climate finance 
A baseline acceptable to contributors may be current climate finance: the existing climate funds and 
those pledged before Copenhagen would define the fixed baseline. This could be the final year before 
Copenhagen, or a five-year average such as 2005-2009 or 2004-2008. On the downside, with this 
model diversion of development-oriented aid is possible, it is difficult to distinguish between old and 
new finance, and information on current climate finance is scarce. In three analyses, we have 
attempted to quantify current levels of climate finance (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2010; Roberts et 
al. 2008; Roberts et al. 2010b). Many definitional problems arise, showing starkly conflicting numbers 
between OECD “Rio Marker” totals and those of our independent categorizations at the project level.  
However with clear definitions and sufficient resources, such a baseline could be constructed for 
major contributor nations. 
 
  
                                                     
14 Separation of development and climate funds in accounting does not mean that the two kinds of funds could 
not be combined in the practical implementation. Indeed, integration of climate considerations into development 
planning is very important. 
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Option 6: Current development assistance  
Very close to current climate finance is the idea of a baseline of current development assistance. In 
this case, all contributions above current development assistance may count as climate finance. Three 
contributor countries, Australia, Finland and Switzerland, use a similar definition to this when saying 
that their fast track pledge is part of an increase in development assistance (WRI 2010). This 
essentially means that all climate finance can be called “new and additional” as long as the 
development part of ODA is increasing. However, this definition has some fundamental flaws: ODA 
has been increasing over time and is expected to increase even more in the future as most countries 
attempt to get closer to their 0.7% of GNI target or their Gleneagles 2005 promises. Australia, Finland 
and Switzerland all fit this pattern: their ODA has increased in the last few years, they have not yet 
met the 0.7% target, and it can be projected that their ODA will increase even more in the future (see 
Figure 3). This baseline will, therefore, not be acceptable for developing countries. 
 
 
Figure 3: Possible projections of development assistance (straight line projections) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis using data from OECD (2010) and WB (2010); for other countries, see Annex 2. 
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Option 7a: Updated projection of development assistance 
Instead of current development assistance levels, updated projections of development assistance could 
be used as a baseline. Business-as-usual funding levels would be re-assessed every year or two, taking 
into account current economic growth in industrialized countries and development assistance 
commitments. This option may be acceptable to contributors, as it could allow future spending on 
climate finance to fall somewhat during economic downturns. Of course, obligations would also 
increase in strong growth years. Although this method is theoretically close to the perfect assessment 
of “new and additional”, in practice it would be difficult to negotiate—and it might fail at creating 
trust between parties, as developed countries may be suspected of gaming the baseline, and because 
the details of how projections are calculated may have to be renegotiated again in the future. To be 
operationalised this method of setting a baseline will need substantial elaboration.  
 
Option 7b: Pre-defined projection of development assistance (with GDP growth adjustment) 
A variant baseline using pre-defined projections of development assistance would avoid this 
permanent re-negotiation by defining the projected business-as-usual level of development assistance 
in advance, according to a realistic growth path for development assistance. The pre-definition task 
would create a debate on which development assistance growth path is most realistic—very recent 
years or a longer-term trend15. Industrialized countries may be concerned about agreeing to specific 
levels of development assistance and climate finance without knowing their future GDP growth and 
related tax income. It is relatively straightforward, however, to use a formula that takes into account 
real GDP growth in later years. The GDP dependence of the funds would be a downside for 
developing countries, but by avoiding re-negotiation of the formula they would benefit from better 
predictability. We do not see any major drawbacks beside some interference with the development 
assistance regime16. 
 
Option 8: New sources only 
A final solution combines all issues: novelty, additionality and acceptability. This baseline would 
count new sources only, meaning that only assistance from novel funding sources—such as 
international air transport levies, currency trading levies or auctioning of emission allowances—would 
be seen as new and additional. Such funds are new by definition, and they are likely to be additional to 
development assistance, as it is highly improbable that new funding instruments—especially the ones 
related to pricing carbon emissions —would be used for development assistance without a climate 
                                                     
15 For example in Figure 3 Switzerland and Finland both show steeper increases over the final three years than 
over the trend—Australia’s ODA was flat and then dropped in 2009, but a longer-term trend since 1996 gives it 
the steepest slope of the three. 
16 This interference is not very severe, since projections of development assistance do not actually impact the 
definition of ODA, as we separate here between ODA (all funds counted as Official Development Assistance 
including climate finance) and development assistance (development funds only; excluding climate finance).  
Stadelmann, Roberts & Michaelowa: Baselines to assess “new and additional” climate finance 
 
 
14 
policy regime. The obvious drawbacks are that it inflexibly bars the use of effective current funding 
streams, and would somewhat arbitrarily define which sources are new. Although we believe that this 
baseline could be acceptable for contributors, they have ruled it out for 2010-2012 fast start financing, 
which will draw on existing sources such as the general budget. Therefore, the ”new sources only” 
option is probably one for longer-term (post-2012) climate finance, especially the ramping up of 
climate finance for the 2020 promise of $100 billion a year, for which the UN Secretary-General’s 
High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing is suggesting especially new sources such 
as carbon taxes, auctioning of emission allowances or levies on international transport (UN 2010). 
 
Summary of options 
When assessing the different baseline options with the criteria discussed (Table 1) most options 
perform very poorly on at least one criterion. Only the baseline options “above a pre-defined 
projection of development assistance with GDP growth adjustment” and “new sources only” can 
guarantee some level of additionality, novelty, and acceptability by parties, as well as transparency 
and consistency with other regimes.  
 
The option “pre-defined projection of development assistance with GDP growth adjustment” does not 
perform very well on any particular criterion, but it also lacks any major drawbacks. It only remains to 
be seen if all parties can accept it, which remains open, as this option has actually never been proposed 
in the negotiation. The second option with no very negative rating on any criterion is “new sources 
only,” which we consider very promising given that there is international agreement that new sources 
are needed. The Copenhagen Accord specifies in its paragraph on financing that “alternative sources 
of finance“ are needed, but does not provide specific suggestions, which shows that a component of a 
baseline has to come from new sources. 
 
 
  
Table 1: Assessment of baseline options 
 
 Basic criterion Basic criterion IPCC criterion IPCC criterion IPCC criterion “institutional feasibility”, assessed by six different sub-criteria 
Criterion Additional to 
development 
assistance 
New to exis-
ting flows and 
pledges 
Environ-
mental  
Effectiveness  
Distributio-
nal conside-
rations 
Political 
feasibility 
(North) 
Political 
feasibility 
(South) 
Feasibility 
given budget 
constraint* 
Transparency 
1:  Clarity of 
definition 
Transparency 
2: Availability 
of data 
Consistency 
with other  
regimes 
Way of assessment No DA 
decrease 
No double 
counting 
Funds for 
mitigation & 
adaptation 
Shift of burden 
away from 
South 
Public 
statements 
Public 
statements 
Total of Deve-
lopment & 
Climate Funds 
Clarity % available Non-interferen-
ce with the DA 
regime 
1) 0.7% GNI +(+) +(+) -- Lower burden 
of South 
-- ++ -- ++ ++ + 
2)  No agreed 
baseline  
-- - + Still high bur-
den of South 
++ -- -- -- (not needed) ++ 
3) New UN 
channels only 
0 + - South better 
represented  
-- ++ - ++ + ++ 
4) No ODA counts ++ (+) - Lower burden 
of South 
-- + - ++ ++ -- 
5)   Current climate 
finance 
- 0 + Middle-
sizetransfers 
+ - 0 -(-) -(-) - 
6)  Current develop-
ment assistance  
- - 0 Low-mid-sized 
transfers 
++ -- 0 ++ - ++ 
7a) Updated projec-
tion of DA 
0 + 0 Middle-
sizetransfers 
+ - ++ -- - - 
7b)  Pre-defined 
projection of DA 
+ (+) - Middle-
sizetransfers 
0 + ++ + - - 
8)  New sources 
only 
+ +(+) - Middle-size 
transfers 
- + + + ++ + 
++ given, + partly given, - not given – not given all; DA = development assistance; * for the allocation of the options in the budget constraint graph, see Annex 1. 
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4. Implications of baseline choice for fast track pledges 
 
When analysing the Copenhagen fast start pledges (“new and additional” climate finance for the 
period 2010-2012), it becomes clear that not many baseline options can be assessed. For several 
baseline options (“Above current development assistance” and “projection of DA”), we are missing 
data for the 2009 and 2010 ODA level, while for “current climate finance” the needed project level 
data is not available17. As well, “new sources only” is currently not assessable, but the share of funds 
from new sources is probably close to zero at the moment according to available data (HBS/ODI 2010; 
WRI 2010). Regarding “new UN channels only”, the information is also scarce: no contributions to 
the planned Copenhagen Green Climate Fund are known, while € 45 million have gone to the 
Adaptation Fund, which is only 0.2% of total fast start money. 
 
When looking at the remaining baseline options, we see that baseline definition has a huge impact on 
the assessment of novelty and additionality (see Table 2): the results range from 0% new and 
additional funds in case of “no ODA counts” to 100% when no baseline is agreed and all contributors 
can define their own baseline. If “0.7% of GNI”, the preferred baseline of developing countries, is 
used then at least 8% of pledged funds can be considered new and additional. The middle way is given 
by another definition, which is not included in the assessment above18 but close to the option “above 
current climate finance”: the novelty beyond existing pledges and budgets. Less than 50% of the 
Copenhagen pledges are new under this definition, while the novelty of funds (compared to finance 
pledges and budgets before Copenhagen) ranges from close to zero in case of Germany to 100% in the 
Dutch, Swedish and Canadian case19. 
 
  
                                                     
17 Data from the OECD CRS system is not comprehensive,  not up to date (see aiddata.org for more 
encompassing data but with similar problems of timeliness), and referring to the climate change indicators (Rio 
Markers) not very reliable, see Michaelowa & Michaelowa (2010). Therefore, researchers would need to 
reassess the official OECD CRS data for 2009 and 2010, when it is available (probably not before 2011 or 2012).  
18 This “new to existing pledges and budgets” definition is not assessed as an option because it is very 
challenging to assess what to consider as pledge and budgeting, including the timeframe. 
19 This numbers, however, have to be taken cautiously, as some countries like the UK or Germany are much 
more closely watched than others. 
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Table 2: Assessment of current fast start finance pledges according to different baseline options 
 
 
Existing knowledge on 
Fast start finance 
Fast start finance that is „new and additional” under the 
following baseline options 
 
Fast Start 
pledge 
(2010-12) 
Budgeted 
or pledged 
before 
New to old 
pledges / 
budgets 
Above 
0.7% GNI 
No agreed 
baseline 
No ODA 
counts 
Contributor $ bn $ bn % % % % 
Germany 1.6 1.5 5% 0% 100% 0% 
UK 2.4 >1.2 <50% 0% 100% 0% 
France 1.6 n/a n/a 0% 100% n/a 
Sweden 1.1 0.0 100% 100% 100% 0% 
Netherlands 0.4 0.0 100% 100% 100% 0% 
Spain 0.5 n/a n/a 0% 100% n/a 
Belgium 0.2 n/a n/a 0% 100% n/a 
Denmark 0.2 n/a n/a 100% 100% 0% 
Austria 0.12 n/a n/a 0% 100% 0% 
Italy 0.8 n/a n/a 0% 100% n/a 
Finland 0.1 0.0 91% 0% 100% 0% 
Ireland 0.1 n/a n/a 0% 100% n/a 
EU Commission 0.2 0.0 100% 0% 100% n/a 
Norway 0.6 0.1 89% 100% 100% n/a 
Japan 15.0 10.0 33% 0% 100% n/a 
US 3.0 1.2 59% 0% 100% n/a 
Canada 0.4 0.0 100% 0% 100% n/a 
Australia 0.6 0.2 59% 0% 100% 0% 
New Zealand 0.0 0.0 n/a 0% 100% n/a 
Switzerland 0.1 0.0 89% 0% 100% 0% 
       
Total $ Bn 29.1 14.3 12.8 2.2 29.1 0.0 
Total % new & add.   44% 8% 100% 0% 
Source 
 
HBS/ ODI 
and WRI 
(2010)* 
HBS/ ODI 
and WRI 
(2010)** 
After HBS/ 
ODI and 
WRI (2010) 
After 
OECD 
(2010) 
Own 
assessment 
After WRI 
(2010)*** 
* HBS/ODI (2010)for Austria, Italy, Belgium,  WRI (2010) for other countries 
** HBS/ODI (2010) for most countries,  WRI (2010) for UK, Germany and Australia 
*** The UK number is derived from faststartfinance.org (2010), the number of the Netherlands results from an email 
communication with Aart van der Horst from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14th September 2010; the 
Austrian number from a letter of finance minister Josef Pröll to MP Barbara Prammer on the 6th of September 2010. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
The current state of no transparency on novelty and additionality of climate finance pledges will 
perpetuate mistrust in the climate regime. Many options for a baseline for a definition what “new and 
additional” means have been put forward but the parties to the UNFCCC have not yet agreed on any. 
From the literature we derive that a meaningful and successful baseline must at least fulfil the 
following criteria: novelty, additionality, equity, acceptability, transparency and consistency with other 
regimes. We conclude that only two of the assessed baseline options are not violating any criterion 
excessively: “Above pre-defined projection of development assistance” and “new sources only”. It is, 
therefore, warranted that parties consider those two baseline options instead of restating their old 
extreme positions of either no baseline or a threshold of 0.7% of GNI going to ODA. 
 
Procedurally, the discussion on a baseline should be included in the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention, as part of a broader MRV framework for climate 
finance. Deciding on elaboration of an MRV system including a baseline is possible in South Africa in 
2011. If a global agreement on a single baseline definition is not possible, a second-best solution 
would be to oblige each contributor to transparently declare its own baseline definition, while 
providing guidance on needed data for each baseline option. 
 
Both industrialized and developing countries can do their part to reach a compromise: while 
industrialized could agree on elaboration of an internationally defined baseline or at least attach a 
baseline to each of their pledges, developing countries may acknowledge that it is almost impossible 
for industrialized countries to contribute $ 10 billion of “new and additional” funding in 2010, as the 
2010 budgets have mostly been determined before Copenhagen. 
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Annex 1: Analysis of location of baseline options along the baseline stringency dimension 
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Annex 2: ODA development of developed countries (in billion current $ per country) 
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